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INTRODUCTION
"'Good fences make good neighbors,"' New England's poet laureate
Robert Frost famously observed.1 But something must be going on in
Williamstown, Massachusetts to make some New Englanders think
differently. The two Williams College academics who wrote these
fascinating recent books are clearly skeptical of Frost's nostrum, at least
insofar as he implied that clearly defined property rights might help to keep
the peace among the quite different players in the two studies. Michael
Brown is an anthropologist at Williams, and in his book Who Owns Native
Culture? he is so skeptical of property rights that he appears to reject his
own title, asserting that the central issue about indigenous cultural
productions is not ownership but rather dignity.2 More on that subject
shortly. Meanwhile, over in the history department, Karen Merrill has
written Public Lands and Political Meaning, in which she similarly decries
what she sees as a baleful but growing tumor of property talk, which has
spread its tentacles into the century-and-a-half-long relationship between
ranchers and public land officials in the Western United States. Both
authors seem to wonder, Why can't everyone just talk it over, without all
this posturing about who owns what? Wouldn't that be better for people
who at the end of the day have to find some way to live with one another?
For one like myself, who has spent a great deal of time tinkering with
property concepts and more than occasionally pointing out their subtle and
misunderstood virtues, these lugubrious views of ownership are a bit
distressing, especially coming as they do in such exceptionally interesting
and informative books. I console myself that at least the authors are talking
about property, which I expect would not have happened in the social
sciences and humanities a decade or two ago. Fortunately, by now at least
the anthropologists have gotten interested in my favorite subject, even if,
like these authors, they don't like it very much,3 and it appears that the
historians may be joining them.
In this Review I will differ somewhat with both authors on the (to me)
endlessly engaging subject of property. This is not to say that these books
don't have a point, or rather, quite a lot of points. Both deal with areas in
which, as any sensible person would notice, there are huge difficulties for
1. ROBERT FROST, Mending Wall, in THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST 33, 33 (Edward
Connery Lathem ed., 1979).
2. MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? 10 (2003).
3. See, e.g., PROPERTY IN QUESTION: VALUE TRANSFORMATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
(Katherine Verdery & Caroline Humphrey eds., 2004) (featuring collections of largely
anthropological and generally rather hostile essays on property); PROPERTY RELATIONS:
RENEWING THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL TRADITION (C.M. Hann ed., 1998) (same).
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what we think of as conventional conceptions of property-that is to say,
"conventional" in a modem commercial society. In raising these challenges,
both authors illustrate some of the cultural limits on our everyday
conceptions of ownership. But in my opinion, neither author sufficiently
credits the possibility that property might do more for them than they
think-or might already be doing more. I think the reason for their
disaffection is this: Each author encounters some persons or groups who
claim property in something they can't or shouldn't have, or shouldn't have
exclusively, and then concludes that all this talk about property is a bad idea
altogether. This seems to me to be throwing the baby out with the
bathwater. It is true, as both authors point out, that currently conventional
categories of property do not match well with the needs of the people they
are describing. That problem in itself can give rise to overreaching. But
there is no reason to think that we are stuck with today's conventions.
Property is a highly malleable institution, and people have adjusted its
institutional contours many times in the past. Despite the many wonderful
insights of these books, the authors do not seem to notice that these
mutations are already underway, right in front of our noses. More
important, newly evolving property rights may well take us closer to the
mutual respect and genuinely negotiated outcomes these authors want to
see. Even "property talk," maligned though it may be in these books, has its
uses: Property talk and rights talk can open up our imaginations to matters
as subtle and as poetic as the relationships between good neighbors.
I. INDIGENOUS HERITAGE: THE SHORTCOMINGS OF BELONGINGS
Brown's book might better have been called "Globalization Meets
Native Culture." He takes the reader on an anthropological tour of the
strains that modem commerce places on indigenous peoples' relationships
to what might be called, for lack of a better phrase, cultural productions.
Thus we meet the Hopi in the Southwest, distressed that the missionaries
and anthropologists of a century ago took photos of their sacred dances and
recorded their music; 4 photos and music like these now are available
worldwide on the Internet.5 We meet as well a group of Australian
Aborigines who claim that the now-quite-successful artworks produced by
one of their own members also belong to the community as a whole.6 Then
there are the members of the Zia Pueblo, who feel strongly that the State of
New Mexico has ripped off one of their symbols for its state flag,7 and the
4. BROWN, supra note 2, at 11-15.
5. Id. at 35-36.
6. Id. at 45.
7. Id. at 70.
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descendants of Crazy Horse, who seethe at the use of their ancestor's name
to advertise an alcoholic beverage.8 Mexican Indian communities claim that
pharmaceutical companies must ask their permission before using local
native plants; Native American groups in the West and the Great Plains
want to get rid of the rock climbers who clamber up sacred cliffs, and,
while they are at it, they would be pleased to oust as well the New Age
cultists who poke around in sacred sites and copy native medicine wheels.9
And for each of these examples, there are many more indigenous peoples
with kindred grievances.
Brown is sympathetic to many of these claims, and he applauds a
number of the legal developments that have given them more weight in
official channels. But he thinks property is generally a rather problematic
route, for two different kinds of reasons. The first reason is the more
expansive, the Big Reason: Property claims are a form of rights talk, and
rights talk is (supposedly) poisonous to good relationships and to the kind
of fluidity and flexibility that people need in their mutual interactions. This
Big Reason overlaps with Merrill's views about the relationships of
ranchers and public lands officials, so I will take it up later with respect to
both authors. Meanwhile, Brown also has a more limited Little Reason why
property claims do not work well for indigenous groups: Modem
commercial conceptions of property simply do not map well onto the kinds
of things indigenous groups want to do.
In their most general form, property rights identify which persons'
claims count against which resources, but in commercial societies,
commentators often cite the right to exclude as property's defining
characteristic.' 0 Exclusivity can be exaggerated, because even the
seemingly most exclusive property claims generally have some porosity.
But as a kind of trope, exclusive rights yield some theoretical leverage.1"
According to standard utilitarian rationales, exclusive property rights
advance investment and trade, and, by advancing those interests, property
also enhances social wealth. These arguments are simple, and, as Richard
Posner points out in his Economic Analysis of Law (citing Blackstone's
eighteenth-century treatise), they have been known "for hundreds of
8. Id. at 77-78.
9. Id. at 120, 162-63.
10. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right To Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REv. 730
(1998).
11. Theoretical "exclusivity" in property needs to be taken with a grain of salt, because any
interest can be subdivided into a multitude of supposedly "exclusive" rights that require
reassembly for any practical use. Indeed, in practice even fairly strongly exclusive property rights,
like those in land in Anglo-American law, include social obligations (e.g., avoiding nuisances to
the neighbors). See Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 YALE
L.J. 601, 612, 621-22, 631 (1998) (treating exclusivity as a trope to serve various functions).
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years." 12 The fundamental idea is that secure ownership encourages
appropriate investment, because the owner takes the benefit of good
decisions and also bears the burden of poor decisions about the owned
thing. This concentrated pattern of rewards and punishments makes the
owner attend carefully to the things she owns. Besides, when ownership is
clear, people in general are less likely to try to grab things and get into
fights over them. Instead, people are more likely to cut deals and trade,
because clear property rights lower the cost of bargaining as they reduce the
costs of identifying owners. Trade itself expands an owner's thinking about
the best ways to invest in and deploy her property, because she now can
take into account not just her own personal use but that of all the potential
buyers in the trading community.
So go the conventional arguments for "standard" property in a
commercial world: While certainly acknowledging that property is
available for personal use and enjoyment, much of the thinking about
property looks outward, to a wider world of investment, trade, and
commerce. This is true not only for tangible property but also for
intellectual property (IP)-a subject, by the way, to which Brown's book
gives the general reader an excellent introduction. Particularly in the United
States, IP is justified by the incentives that it gives for investment and trade,
in the expectation that the resulting commerce will ultimately enhance the
general production and dissemination of ideas.
But what do the Hopi care about all this investment and trade when
they face losing control over the images of sacred rituals? As Brown points
out, what the Hopi want is confidentiality and even secrecy, not
dissemination; that is why the standard categories of IP are so out of sync
with their wishes. Their major concern is not money or fame. They simply
don't want other people to rummage promiscuously through the imagery
that matters so deeply to them. Interestingly enough, one of their
preoccupations is with maintaining the balance among the various
subgroups that make up the clan itself. As Brown describes the situation,
the Hopi are made up of a number of subgroups added over time, and it
enhances the tribe's sense of oneness that each subgroup has a special role
to play in the tribe's ceremonial experiences. By hiding the details of the
various subgroups' ritual contributions, the Hopi make certain every
subgroup depends on every other. If secrets get out, there will be trouble-
not so much because outsiders will learn the secrets, but rather because
those secrets may leak back from outsiders to the wrong subgroups of
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
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insiders, so that the subgroups may not think that they need to depend on
one another so much.
13
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the Hopi and other indigenous groups
are not well served by standard categories of intellectual property law, with
their fixed eye to investment, commerce, and the commercial dissemination
of knowledge. Trademark didn't help Native American groups in their
effort to keep a certain Washington, D.C. football franchise from using the
name "Redskins"; apparently the name wasn't insulting enough to be
denied trademark status, and even if it had been, the football team could
have used the name anyway-just without a trademark. 14 Copyright would
not have helped the Snuneymuxw in Canada to keep their ancient, sacred
petroglyph imagery for themselves; while long in duration, copyright is not
forever, as tribal groups often want. Besides, copyright only attaches to
things one makes up oneself, and it does not prevent others from coming up
with their own versions of, say, a given narrative or image.' 5 Had it been
tried, patent could not have helped the Native Americans of the Great
Plains keep the New Agers from making their own bogus prayer wheels and
doing a lot of mumbo jumbo around them. 16 Yes, patent rights are
exclusive, but they are reserved for "useful" objects, and the object itself
has to be described in considerable detail precisely so that others can make
it-not something that native groups are always willing to do.
In short, standard intellectual property is not very helpful when you do
not want to sell your expressions or inventions but rather want to keep
others' mitts off them, so that these objects and images are not coarsened
and diluted by reproduction and profane uses among people who do not
know or care about their significance. The Internet only makes things
worse: What might originally have been a guarded disclosure to a trusted
and interested outsider now can easily slip out into a digitized version, there
to be perused by the world at large. No wonder native groups have little
truck with the "information wants to be free" crowd of the so-called
copyleft; for some native groups, open access is the problem, not the
solution.1 7 Instead, some are starting to turn to that most old-fashioned
method of keeping intellectual property intact: secrecy. As Brown points
13. BROWN, supra note 2, at 13-14. For other groups, see id. at 28, 30, 34. The one exception
to Brown's generally excellent introduction to IP is trade secret law, which he dismisses in a
footnote, id. at 296 n.13, but which might be adapted for use in situations of this sort.
14. Pro-Football v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003).
15. The Snuneymuxw actually used a special protective law of Canada, which required them
to place copies of the petroglyph designs in a public registry. BROWN, supra note 2, at 83-85; see
also Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual Property
the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REv. 1 (1997) (pointing out related issues).
16. For the New Age uses of Indian sites, see BROWN, supra note 2, at 162-63.
17. Id. at 237.
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out, this is a shame, because secrecy throws up walls around everyone
else's knowledge of native culture. 18 But then, maybe that is the point.
There is a bit of a minor key that sounds through these laments,
however: Brown lets the reader know that indigenous groups are not always
quite as interested in keeping secrets as they are in making sure that they
themselves get the revenue if the cat gets out of the bag. The Hopi are mad
at the Navajo for making kachina dolls because the Navajo dolls, they say,
are a ripoff of a Hopi art form-and besides that, they also crowd out the
Hopi's own market for the dolls.19 Meanwhile, indigenous groups in Latin
America seem to be quite ready to give away the secrets of their cultivars
and medicinal plants, if giving them up means that pharmaceutical
companies will pay them for their local knowledge. z Similarly, the Zia in
New Mexico may not like the sun symbol showing up all over the place,
but they have worked out a trademark deal that allows them to license its
use to interested parties, and presumably they could charge if they wished.21
An indigenous interest in commercial profit should not give rise to a lot
of knowing winks and cynical smirks, though. The indigenous group may
really not like its images being spread around, and the members may
especially dislike it when others spread them around for money. For one
thing, if images are marketed, they are likely to be distributed over a much
wider ambit than they would be if they were simply given to some
individual for personal use. For another, if the images are already up for
sale, the proceeds might as well go to the originators. To borrow a term
from economists, this might be considered a problem of the "second best,"
which dogs commodification of many intimate goods.22 First best might be
no sales at all, but as long as sales are inevitable, the second-best solution
might be that the money goes to the creators and their progeny. And, by the
way, this is an attitude held not just by indigenous groups. Some modem
scientists feel the same way: They would prefer that investigative results be
freely available to all, but if somebody is going to cash in on the
information, they would just as soon have the cash in their own pockets.23
Notice that such commercial uses are not far out of line with
conventional property conceptions, including intellectual property. While
the current IP categories might not work exactly, it doesn't take much of a
18. Id. at 29-32, 146.
19. Id. at 19.
20. Id. at 114.
21. Id. at 70-71.
22. Carol M. Rose, Whither Commodification?, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES
AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., forthcoming
2005) (manuscript at 7-12, on file with author).
23. Robert P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons: The Case of Scientific
Research, in SCIENTIFIC INNOVATION, PHILOSOPHY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 145, 158-59, 163 (Ellen
Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1996).
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tweak to permit native groups to capitalize on the commercial possibilities
of their creations. The Zia have done so by trademarking their symbols;
why can't others do the same? Yes, yes, there are little hitches; for example,
in our current trademark law, a certifying organization is not supposed to be
selling the certified goods,24 for the very sensible reason that we want
consumers to know that publications like Good Housekeeping can honestly
claim they are disinterested when they put a seal of approval on some
gadget. This could get in the way of indigenous peoples' certifications of
their own goods, but it is basically a technical detail of IP law.
Conventional IP scholars and activists are now hard at work coming up
with arrangements through which commercial users of native cultural
productions at least have some obligations to the indigenous creators.
Brown does raise some important problems with these efforts, though,
and they are problems of a sort familiar to property law scholars. The
general scenario is this: Some group of people claims collective cultural
ownership of an artifact or useful substance, or it claims that a particular
location is central to a spiritual practice. Why is this problematic? There are
at least three reasons, one about evidence of the practice, a second about the
identity of the claiming group, and a third about the thing claimed. The
evidentiary question is, roughly, What signals of ownership are these
people using, and how can we know they really mean it? To illustrate the
difficulty, Brown retells the story of an Australian Aboriginal group that
opposed a bridge-building project, saying that the bridge would go to an
island that was the site of women's rituals, whose nature was undisclosed.26
In the last decade and a half, Australia has been extraordinarily attentive to
Aboriginal land claims (after having systematically ignored them for a
century or more) and is now very much attuned to cultural signals that
suggest Aboriginal title.2 7 But officials did not know what to make of the
claims of "women's business," which were supported perhaps by beliefs
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5) (2000) (providing that a certification mark is cancelable at any time
if the registrant produces or markets certified goods).
25. See, e.g., Thomas Cottier & Marion Panizzon, Legal Perspectives on Traditional
Knowledge: The Case for Intellectual Property Protection, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 371 (2004);
Laurence R. Heifer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2004); Susan Scafidi, Intellectual
Property and Cultural Products, 81 B.U. L. REv. 793 (2001).
26. BROWN, supra note 2, at 172-8 1.
27. Id. at 46-50. As Brown notes, the critical turning point was the Australian High Court's
decision in Mabo v. Queensland 11 (1992) 175 C.L.R. I (Austi.), which overturned Australia's
longstanding denial of all Aboriginal land claims and set the stage for intensive inquiries into the
bases for such claims. Not all have resulted in outcomes favorable to native title, however. For
legal developments since Mabo, see Carlos Scott Lopez, Reformulating Native Title in Mabo's
Wake: Aboriginal Sovereignty and Reconciliation in Post-Centenary Australia, 11 TULSA J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 21 (2003) (arguing for greater sensitivity to Aboriginal land sensibilities).
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but by little evidence of actual practice and which, as it turned out, were
denounced as a fraud by other women in the same group.28
There is a solution to this problem, of course, one even offered by some
anthropologists: Cultural knowledge is unevenly distributed within the
group, and those not in the know should shut up and defer to the insiders
who do know-those are the people whose permission should be asked.29
Brown clearly has little use for this answer, but it provides a segue into the
second problem in claiming culture: defining the group that owns the
relevant cultural property. In claiming a particular cultivar, story, song, or
symbol, an indigenous group is setting itself up as the owner whose
permission must be asked before others learn about it or repeat it. But
insofar as that claim suggests exclusive ownership, it can be quite
problematic, because a number of groups may tell similar stories or use
similar plants; they may well have traded these stories and plants among
themselves, tinkering and improving all along the way. And if exclusive
claims are problematic, overlapping ones can be even worse, because there
are so many of them coming from so many directions. Well-meaning
pharmaceutical researchers have found themselves stymied by all these
demands; when one such project in Mexico attempted to compensate local
indigenous communities for their role in maintaining medicinal plants with
pharmacological potential, the project participants found themselves facing
a cacophony of claimants and complainants.3 ° Perhaps to avoid such
complications from local claimants, some field researchers have simply
bypassed the whole lot of them and instead bought the plants at local
markets, naturally asking the market sellers about potential uses.3'
This problem of multiple claimants, all tending to value their own
contributions particularly highly, is a familiar one to legal scholars. It
presents an issue of transaction costs or, more specifically in resource-
related contexts, of the "anticommons." In the anticommons, there are so
many and such diffuse holders of purportedly exclusive claims to a given
resource that they can never be brought to agreement, with the result that
the resource can never be used at all.32 Brown is familiar with the
anticommons concept, but he discusses it in connection with conventional
28. BROWN, supra note 2, at 179-80.
29. Id. at 183-84.
30. Id. at 119-24; see CORI HAYDEN, WHEN NATURE GOES PUBLIC: THE MAKING AND
UNMAKING OF BIOPROSPECTING IN MEXICO 100-08 (2003).
31. BROWN, supra note 2, at 124; HAYDEN, supra note 30, at 141, 145-50; see id. at 126-57
(describing ethnobotanical research in Mexican markets more generally).
32. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REv. 621, 624 (1998); see also Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280
SCIENCE 698 (1998) (applying the anticommons idea to scientific research).
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intellectual property, where other scholars have already flagged the issue.33
He may not have noticed how relevant the anticommons concept is to the
very native claims that he is describing-the multiple claimants on cultivars
or artworks or cultural productions, whose crosscutting demands might
make the relevant information or creative works unusable by anyone.
What really interests Brown, though, is the third problem: Just what is
the thing that a group claims to own? In particular, can a whole culture be
owned? Interestingly enough, claims to exclusive ownership of a culture
map onto a fundamental debate within anthropology: On one side (not
Brown's) is the view that culture is a self-contained object, something that
can be claimed exclusively by its creator-owners-and indeed should be so
claimed, because culture is a delicate thing, easily infected and corrupted by
outside influences. The other side takes quite the opposite view: Culture is
not at all self-contained, but rather robust, fluid, or, as Brown puts it,
"hybrid," merrily mixing all kinds of disparate elements.
Brown is squarely in the hybridity camp, and he thinks the purity camp
is dangerously mistaken. He especially dislikes seeing its influence in
modem protective laws-laws that would establish a kind of ownership in
whole cultures. Brown calls this initiative "Total Heritage Protection. 34
Underlying it is the anthropological assumption that while a culture may
consist of many interacting parts, it is still a single Thing, and a rather
fragile one at that. The idea is that each indigenous group has created an
entire set of practices of its own and that these form a seamless whole that
only insiders understand; the consequence is that only those insiders should
set the rules for access by outsiders.35 Brown thinks that when
anthropologists operate on views like this (and influence lawyers to do the
same), they may become overly solicitous of their own little groups, with
the result that they lose their grip on evidentiary standards and succumb to
credulity about spurious indigenous cultural claims-as perhaps happened
with the women's business in Australia, among others.36 He might have
added that these rather solemn views invite mockery, as in the mountain
climbers' claims that they too have a religion, one that impels them to climb
in the very areas that have long been Native American sacred sites.37
It is not clear to this writer, however, how many anthropologists
actually hang on to such hermetically tribalistic views of culture; these
notions seem rather antique, not to say quaint, now that anthropologists are
33. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 32.
34. BROWN, supra note 2, at 209.
35. Id. at 209-12.
36. Id. at 190-92.
37. Id. at 163 (noting some climbers' claims that climbing is their religion, protected by the
First Amendment).
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chasing around investigating Internet banking practices and post-Soviet
decollectivization of industry. 38 Perhaps instead it is just us lawyers, with
our usual lag time, who threaten to perpetuate such pieties. But be that as it
may, Brown argues that the group-property-like claims of Total Heritage
Protection are completely out of place in a real world in which Hopi kids
form reggae bands and become the hit of the rez.
39
Ultimately, according to Brown, the object should be "respect" for
indigenous culture rather than ownership-respect that comes out of claims
based on actual practice rather than asserted belief, and that entails messy
negotiations that begin without fixed starting positions and end with
renegotiable compromises. His central examples of the right way to
proceed, interestingly enough, come from the kind of property that Merrill's
book takes up: public lands. Thus in northeast Wyoming, the Park Service
worked out an arrangement whereby at important ceremonial times, rock
climbers generally have agreed (with the exception of some recalcitrants) to
stay off a cliff sacred to the region's Native Americans; at the Bighorn
Medicine Wheel in the same state, the Forest Service exhorts the generally
cooperative tourists to keep a respectful distance when Native American
ceremonies take place.4°
Consistent with this insistence on fluidity and messiness, Brown offers
a somewhat messy concluding chapter devoted to potential aids in
negotiating respect for native culture. He does not eschew all legal roads;
for example, he likes the way the Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) has pushed mainstream archivists and
museum professionals into discussions and negotiations with Native
American groups. What is most striking about this chapter, though, is the
waffling about his distaste for rights in general and for property rights in
particular. To be sure, his antiproperty position is not uniform throughout
the book; in one earlier chapter, for example, he points out that indigenous
peoples themselves frequently have had some conception of ownership of
knowledge and cultural artifacts. 41 He goes so far as to find some room for
Western IP regimes: Some versions of IP, he thinks, could be more helpful
to indigenous groups than the idea that native knowledge and creativity
belong to the "common heritage of mankind," a move that throws their
achievements open to all as a giant commons. In this respect he is reserved
38. See, e.g., Bill Maurer, Cyberspatial Properties: Taxing Questions About Proprietary
Regimes, in PROPERTY IN QUESTION, supra note 3, at 297; Katherine Verdery, Property and
Power in Transylvania's Decollectivization, in PROPERTY RELATIONS, supra note 3, at 160.
39. BROWN, supra note 2, at 221.
40. Id. at 144-73.
41. Id. at 88-89; see also Mark C. Suchman, Invention and Ritual: Notes on the Interrelation
of Magic and Intellectual Property in Preliterate Societies, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1264, 1264-67
(1989) (arguing that magic serves as intellectual property in preliterate societies).
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about the appropriateness for native cultures of the ideas of some modem
anti-IP scholars, who would like to cut back substantially on intellectual
property.42 Though he detests Total Heritage Protection and expresses great
doubts about the rigid exclusivity of patent law, he likes the idea of a
weaker form of licensing of native knowledge on a group basis, 43 and he
suggests that perhaps some tweaks of the looser copyright and trademark
laws could further accommodate native concerns about protecting their
individual or collective creative works. 44
But in spite of these practical concessions and accommodations, at the
end of the day he invokes the legal scholar Mary Ann Glendon to deride
what he and she both see as the cascade of "rights talk, '45 a phrase that
itself signals a derogatory attitude toward solving problems through the
allocation of entitlements. With this, of course, we arrive at Brown's Big
Reason why property rights are a problem. It isn't just the little things, the
ways that specific commercial property categories fail to match indigenous
needs. Instead, in the final analysis, Brown seems to think that all this
blabbing about rights, and especially about property rights, lends itself to a
mindset too fixed and rigid to deal with the realities of native cultural
claims.
This is clearly a book full of wonderful insights, but Brown's swipes at
rights in general and property rights in particular do raise some issues not
well resolved in the book. In particular, his scorn seems to run at cross-
purposes with several of the positions he wishes to advance.
First, there is his view that respect comes through negotiation. In any
negotiation, rights clearly form the background; indeed, even Brown
mentions that negotiations take place "in the shadow of the law"4 6 -that is
to say, in the shadow of rights. Although Brown cites the more conservative
Glendon for his anti-rights-talk position, he might just as well have cited
some members of the more leftist Critical Legal Studies group, who also
eschew all this chatter about rights.47 But feminists and critical race
theorists have undertaken something of a rescue of rights and rights talk,
42. BROWN, supra note 2, at 236-38.
43. Id. at 240.
44. Id. at 237.
45. Id. at 231 (citing MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991)).
46. Id. at 246; see also Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow
of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968-69 (1979) (arguing that participants'
substantive and procedural rights influence outcomes of bargaining).
47. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1382-94 (1984)
(critiquing rights talk).
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which they regard as an important source of social progress.48 In one variant
on this theme, feminist and family law scholars critique the so-called
divorce revolution of the last generation, through which both parents were
to be regarded as having equal interests in the custody of children. This
well-meaning development was in fact a reduction of the wife's
entitlements in the dissolution of a garden-variety marriage, because the
more old-fashioned approach generally had given her the house and the
kids. At the post-"revolution" negotiating table, this loss of rights means
that she may well have to bargain away the house in order to get the kids.49
The point is that the outcome of negotiations-and even the fact that
anyone will negotiate with you at all-depend a great deal on the
entitlements that you have when you show up at the table. One might well
suspect, for example, that the museum professionals and the Park Service
agents now spend more time negotiating with Native American groups
because new legislation has given those groups some rights, even if the
rights are no more than an entitlement to a hearing. Brown wants to engage
the museum curators' professionalism in the quest for respect for native
culture, but a century ago, professionalism did little to prevent the autopsy
and dismemberment of a deceased Native American who had lived in the
custody of anthropologists and who had expressly rejected this procedure
for his remains. ° Indigenous groups' claims have a very substantial moral
weight, as Brown quite rightly points out, 51 but legislation confirms and
adds to that weight, just as it helps to alter the standards of professionalism.
And in fact, Brown appears to approve of such legislation and the rights it
confers. He just prefers rights of the fuzzier type. One might respond,
though, that fuzzy rights are rights too, even if they are fuzzy.
Putting that objection to one side for the moment, a second problematic
issue concerns the relationship between fuzzy rights and Brown's stated
goal of flexibility. He seems to prefer fuzzy rights because he thinks that
they will lead to lots of talk and give-and-take-this in contrast to more
firmly defined rights (and especially property rights), which he thinks
freeze things in place and reduce the fluidity that negotiations bring. This is
a view that he shares with Merrill (of whom more shortly), but just with
respect to Brown's subjects, it is a view that calls for some qualification.
Sharply defined rights only freeze things if their use rights are not
transferable-that is to say, if they are inalienable. But once ights can be
48. Introduction to CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT, at xiii, xxii-xxvii (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) (reviewing differences
arising between feminist and critical race writers and the Critical Legal Studies movement).
49. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND
REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 149-50, 163-64 (1991).
50. Clifford Geertz, Morality Tale, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 7, 2004, at 4 (book review).
51. BROWN, supra note 2, at 245.
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transferred, markets are likely to enter the picture, and whatever attributes
might be assigned to markets, frozenness is not one of them. To this reader,
it is somewhat disappointing that Brown is not more interested in market
transactions, because markets undoubtedly help to shape culture and,
indeed, to shift cultural elements around in a veritable hydra of hybridity.
Brian Spooner has observed how Turkmen carpet weavers have redesigned
their wares to meet their European customers' ideas of authenticity,52 and it
would not be altogether surprising if similar motivations were bringing
about reworkings of kachina dolls or Australian Aboriginal "dreaming"
paintings. Some might gripe that such a development undermines the very
idea of authenticity, but so what? For one who sees culture as hybrid,
market influences ought to be an interesting channel through which cultural
elements flow into one another.
Markets thrive on well-defined rights, where everyone knows who
owns what; it is rather the fuzzier rights that tend to impede transactions
and slow things down while the various stakeholders scope one another out
and jockey for position. True, fuzzy rights might make people talk more,
but all that talk means that fuzzy rights are, if anything, rather viscous. In
fact, one might come away from Brown's book thinking that flexibility is
not really what he wants after all and that his real desideratum is viscosity.
This would accord with Brown's self-description as one who occupies a
middle ground; perhaps viscous entitlements preserve a middle ground of a
somewhat slow-moving cultural hybridity, somewhere between the
sclerosis of the anticommons (or inalienable Total Heritage Protection) on
the one side and the dizzyingly rapid speed of global markets on the other.
If the former really do stifle all access and use, the latter threaten to
dissolve native culture altogether.
Avoiding this kind of dissolution may be the reason why Brown wants
to avoid conventionally understood property rights, which are so easily
traded, and why he instead looks to fuzzy rights to reach the goal of
respect-his desideratum for interactions between indigenous and
mainstream societies. But that raises a third issue: Fuzzy rights have at best
an ambiguous relationship to respect for anyone. Here I ask the reader to
undertake a thought experiment and to ask, Which of the following
statements from A to B implies greater respect on the part of A for B?
(1) A: I can only take this stuff with your consent. (B has a property
right.)
(2) A: I can only take this stuff after we talk it over, and then only if
necessary. (B has a consultation right-strong form.)
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Appadurai ed., 1986).
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(3) A: I can only take this stuff after we talk it over. (B has a
consultation right-weak form.)
(4) A: I can only take this stuff after I let you know I am doing so. (B
has a notice right.)
(5) A: I can take this stuff whether you like it or not. (B has no right.)
So, under which scenario would you say that A has most respect for B?
The point of this didactic little exercise is that strong property rights do
imply respect, and that other versions of rights-like the fuzzy fights (2)
through (4)-imply less respect, though certainly more than (5), where poor
B has no rights at all. This is not to say that strong property rights in a
conventional sense are appropriate to every subject. Take water, for
example: Because water is so much more difficult to fence than land is,
water rights regimes tend to incorporate many more accommodations to the
whole community of water rights holders.53 Similarly, copyright is full of
exceptions54 -and perhaps it should have even more-in light of the fact
that the creation and dissemination of expressive works may come from
sharing as well as from the incentives that property brings.
It may well be that many indigenous cultural claims are also impossible
to fit into the form of strongly exclusive property rights-Brown is
certainly convincing when he argues that whole cultures cannot be treated
as objects of exclusive rights. Quite aside from the issues that his book
raises, one might note a point made above, that strongly exclusive property
rights actually are too easily traded in the market, and markets themselves
can erode a whole range of cultural practices so swiftly that little survives.
There have been plenty of times when well-defined rights in the hands of
indigenous peoples have gotten traded rapidly away to others who have a
better sense of their market value.55 This is a reason that, in the past, some
indigenous fights have been made inalienable or only limitedly alienable.
Perhaps fuzzy rights are the best that can be done when more sharply
defined (and tradeable) rights might have such a dissolving effect on a local
community. If so, fuzzy fights may represent a kind of compromise position
about respect, a halfway house between cultural preservation and the
genuine respect that accompanies attentiveness to property rights.
53. See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and
Markets, 81 CAL. L. REv. 671 (1993) (describing the importance of institutions in water
allocation).
54. Most notably, the Copyright Act explicitly permits a variety of "fair uses" of copyrighted
material, though unauthorized by the copyright holder. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); see, e.g.,
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (permitting parodic reproduction of a song).
55. See, e.g., Stuart Banner, Two Properties, One Land: Law and Space in Nineteenth-
Century New Zealand, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 807, 844-45 (1999) (describing the rapid
purchase of Maori land by settlers once Maori lands were opened to individual sale, followed by
the collapse of tribal authority).
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Finally, to repeat, fuzzy rights are rights too, even if they are fuzzy. The
point is this: Despite its appearance of formalism, property law has never
had much trouble generating new kinds of rights to suit the occasion,
including new fuzzy rights.56 Property rights are a lot more changeable than
Brown lets on. The very fact that we have fuzzy rights in other property
domains-copyright, for example, with its many exceptions, or even landed
property, with its constraints of nuisance-suggests that property rights are
malleable and that they can be refashioned to meet new demands. The
modem residential lease is worlds away from the agricultural lease of the
sixteenth century or from the modem commercial lease in a shopping
center, but property makes room for all of them. Just within the United
States, water rights differ substantially between the humid East and the dry
West. In a world that has now concocted new properties in "moral rights"
for artists' creative works57 and tradeable allowances for coal-burning
utilities' sulfur emissions,58 it is hard to imagine that we cannot craft
property rights suitable to protect native culture without stultifying it. Such
properties could include modest group claims and consultative rights.
Indeed, some of the legislation that Brown describes seems to be feeling its
way toward these newer kinds of entitlements-fuzzy, to be sure, but
certainly not foreign to property.
No wonder, then, that when push comes to shove, Brown waffles on
property. For the most part, he signs on to too conventional a view about
what property is and what it can become, but he quite obviously notices
property's usefulness all the same. The modem statutes that give new rights
to indigenous groups59 are well on the way to reshaping and reconstructing
entitlements in ways that may suit the modem relationships between
indigenous peoples and surrounding societies-relationships that entail the
very desiderata that Brown wants: flexibility, negotiation, and respect. The
fundamental task is to get a firmer grip on the kinds of rights that are useful
toward these ends and not to suppose that we can throw out the idea of
rights-and property-altogether. What we need to do, as Robert Frost
56. For the uses of formalism in property law, see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith,
Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J.
1 (2000) (arguing that property law operates through a limited number of standardized legal
forms). Nevertheless, the relevant standardized forms clearly change over time; no real estate
lawyer today knows much about the dizzying array of "incorporeal hereditaments" that
Blackstone described (e.g., advowsons, dignities, and corodies), whereas Blackstone knew
nothing of condominium restrictions and time-shares. For Blackstone's proliferation of property
forms, see Rose, supra note 11, at 609-10.
57. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L.
REV. 1 (1997) (describing stronger European and weaker American versions of "moral rights" of
authors to control treatment of creative works even after sale).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 7651b (2000).
59. See, e.g., Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA),
25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2000).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1006 [Vol. 114: 991
HeinOnline -- 114 Yale L.J. 1006 2004-2005
Property in All the Wrong Places?
would have said, is to consider what kind of fences we want, and what
should get fenced in and what fenced out-and perhaps where some
passageways should go.
II. WHOSE HOME ON THE RANGE?
The connection between property and respect reappears in sharp focus
in the opening scenario of Merrill's terrific new book, in which she
recounts the story of the movie Shane, a classic depiction of the conflict
between homesteaders and ranchers in the late-nineteenth- and early-
twentieth-century West.60 The ranchers occupied a world full of macho
swagger and bravado, and at least in those early extravagant days, perhaps
it was their very self-assuredness that let them disdain any talk of property.
On the contrary, right from the start, the people talking about property were
the ones who were also demanding respect: first, respect for the
homesteaders' claims, like those of Shane's Joe Starrett, but then later
respect for environmentalists' claims and even, in the end, respect for
claims made by the ranchers themselves, as they increasingly came to see
themselves as beleaguered victims whose contributions went unnoticed
without the solidity of property.
Like Brown's book, much of Merrill's beautifully written Public Lands
and Political Meaning is devoted to a set of resources for which, she says,
conventional property concepts have never seemed to work out very well.
To be sure, the rhetoric of property rights did seem perfectly attuned to one
segment of the range and the activities carried out there. That was
homesteading. Property was the very heart of homesteading. At the outset,
the homesteaders would get land in return for what we now would call
"sweat equity" (a phrase often used these days in conjunction with the so-
called "urban homesteading" of abandoned buildings61). As in the usual
property story, the prospect of secure rights would encourage homesteaders
to invest labor in the land, and their success would presumably invite others
to come and do likewise. Moreover, homesteaders' farms seemed to fit
perfectly with the activities associated with property: As farmers,
homesteaders would communicate the extent of their claims by putting up
fences, plowing the back forty, gardening in the vegetable plots, erecting
farmhouses and outbuildings, and in general taking a panoply of measures
that, in the classic language of original acquisition at common law, would
60. KAREN R. MERRILL, PUBLIC LANDS AND POLITICAL MEANING: RANCHERS, THE
GOVERNMENT, AND THE PROPERTY BETWEEN THEM 1 (2002).
61. See, e.g., Thomas A. Loftus, Reforming Welfare: Are Effective Property Rights a Key?,
7 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 387, 411-13 (1996) (describing sweat equity and urban
homesteading programs and suggesting reforms).
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demonstrate to the world their intention to dominate the relevant location.
Indeed, the world over, agriculture was the one kind of activity that clearly
denoted recognizable property to settlers in the common law tradition;
farming was the reason why British settlers thought the New Zealand Maori
owned their land, whereas the lack of farming was the reason why they paid
no attention to the claims of Australia's Aborigines.62 Finally, in a matter
particularly important to American traditions, homestead farms were small,
generally limited by law to 160 acres; they were supposed to be manageable
by a single hardy yeoman farmer and his equally hardy wife and family, in
the ideal type of small-r republican independence.
Unfortunately for the West, smallness did not work well when property
rhetoric was translated into real-life holdings. The standard 160 acres could
not sustain agricultural activities in the Plains or, as they used to be called,
the Great American Desert. 63 Eastern farming methods were inappropriate
in large part because water was so limited in the West. This brute fact led to
some very significant changes in American land law. One was reflected in
the Desert Lands Act of 1877,64 which permitted states to sever water rights
from land rights, so that farmers could build irrigation channels with some
security about the future water supply; this alteration paved the way for
legal recognition of the appropriative water rights system that now
distinguishes the Western states from those in the East.65 Another legal
change was to expand the size of the homestead, to sizes varying between
320 and 640 acres, but even this was not enough.66 John Wesley Powell, the
great explorer of the Colorado River and later head of the Geological
Survey, proposed in 1879 to multiply the homestead size to 2560 acres on
arid and semiarid lands to accommodate grazing homesteads where farming
was not feasible.67 But tracts of this size meant giving up on the yeoman
farmer ideal, and Congress resisted.68
62. Banner, supra note 55, at 809, 821-23; see also Stuart Banner, Why Terra Nullius?
Anthropology and Property Law in Early Australia, 23 LAW & HIST. REv. 95, 99-101, 104 (2005)
(describing how English settlers thought Australia was uninhabited because of the lack of
improvements to land).
63. For the origin of this phrase in an 1821 map by Stephen H. Long, see Stanley K. Schultz
& William P. Tishler, Which Old West and Whose?, http://us.history.wisc.edu/hist102/weblect/
lec03/03_02.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2005). The map, contained in 1 EDWIN JAMES, ACCOUNT
OF AN EXPEDITION FROM PITTSBURGH TO THE ROCKY MOUNTAINS, PERFORMED IN THE YEARS
1819, 1820, at vii (1823), can be viewed at http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/ewisandclark/images/
ree09pl .jpg.
64. 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-323, 325, 327-329 (2000).
65. A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK IN LAW AND
PUBLIC POLICY 882 (5th ed. 2002).
66. MERRILL, supra note 60, at 43, 155; see also GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL.,
FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 80-81 (5th ed. 2002) (describing stockraising land
legislation).
67. MERRILL, supra note 60, at 29, 106.
68. Id. at 29.
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One reason the congressmen resisted was that they had already seen the
grazing interests, and they did not like what they saw. Cattlemen began to
loose their herds in earnest onto the Great Plains in the years after the Civil
War, much aided by the opening of the railways in the 1870s and by the
slaughter of the great competing herds, the bison, in the 1880s.
69
These cattlemen were antihomesteaders, both literally and
symbolically. Because of the thinness of the grasses in the West, the cattle
interests used vast expanses of land rather than the modest stakes
contemplated for homestead-farmers. As Merrill very tellingly recounts,
early rancher society was relentlessly male, with no room for women and
families. 70 Instead of the democratic self-governance of republican yeomen,
the grazing business was thoroughly hierarchical, running from the cattle
barons at the top down to the hired-hand cowpokes at the bottom. 7I The
early cattlemen were entirely uninterested in settled locations, permanent
structures, or nicely plowed fields and trim fences; they wanted to use the
nation's vast grasslands on a transient basis, and they had no investment in
land in mind.72
It was quite consistent that, unlike the homesteaders, the cattlemen for
many years did not want to own the lands they planned to exploit.
Moreover, they did not want anyone else to have property in the grasslands
either, certainly not the pesky homesteaders who might challenge their
privileges. At most they wanted (and got) property in the very scarce water
source locations in the high plains, because controlling those locations
meant that they could effectively control huge land areas without owning
them. 73 But ownership? Certainly not: Ownership would entail taxes, which
they did not wish to pay any more than they wished to purchase the land in
the first place.74 In short, the cattlemen understood that property involves
investment and responsibility, and they had no intention of bothering with
either.
Was there any justification for this brazen behavior, this exploitation
that upped the ante even on the ruthless captains of industry, who at least
owned and presumably paid taxes on their dark satanic mills? Well, yes,
there was a justification of sorts. The plains were not worth a damn for
anything else. Or at least so said the cattlemen. They thought that they took
69. Id. at 18-19; see also ANDREW C. ISENBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BISON: AN
ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY, 1750-1920 (2000).
70. MERRILL, supra note 60, at 42-43.
71. Id. at 20-22.
72. Id. at 18-22, 42.
73. id. at 17, 183.
74. See id. at 131 ("[M]any ranchers noted that only by not owning too much land could they
make money in the business, given how heavy the burden of owning the large acreage required for
ranching was.").
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great risks in running their herds on these otherwise arid and worthless
lands; if the high plains had any economic value at all, they said, it was
because the cattlemen had created it. 75 It followed that, because there were
no viable alternatives, valuation was impossible. Besides, it was the
cattlemen themselves who had brought something of value out of a desert-
why should they have to pay, either in purchase price upfront or taxes
downstream? Anyway, the government had always practically given away
the public lands, for example, to homesteaders and miners.
Merrill, to her credit, presents these views with admirable balance and
even some sympathy. They might have been more persuasive had the
ranchers not exerted so much energy to shut out alternative users of the
rangeland, notably the homesteaders at the outset and, in more recent times,
environmentalists. 76 In any event, the ranchers' behavior, amply justified to
themselves by their own rationalizations, led to an uneasy situation in
which they effectively controlled the public rangeland without formally
owning it, and in which the federal government simply could not challenge
them--despite a set of practices totally at odds with the mythology of the
much-idealized homesteader. But time marches on, and Merrill describes at
length the way the grazing interests began to organize themselves after the
great cattle baron era of the later nineteenth century. Some of the ranchers
began to settle in and raise a bit of forage for themselves, and to talk as if
they too, as agriculturalists of a sort, might become some kind of larger-
scale homesteaders; others, however, wanted nothing to do with any fool
ideas of propertizing the range." Besides, another plan for the range soon
emerged: First the Forest Service (at the turn of the twentieth century) and
then the grazing bureaucracy (under the Taylor Grazing Act of 193478)
withdrew the rangelands from settlement, thus seemingly guaranteeing
ranchers free or very cheap access and keeping out pretty much everybody
else. If one thinks of property as the right to exclude, the ranchers really did
seem to want all the benefits of property; they just got the federal
75. Id. at 85.
76. For some inventive earlier exclusionary practices, see Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S.
518 (1897) (upholding a U.S. statute curtailing grazing interests' practice of fencing private
rangelands in such a way as to exclude others from access to public lands). For some modem
environmentalist efforts to acquire grazing leases, see Erik Ryberg, Comment, Comedy of Errors
or Confederacy of Dunces? The Idaho Constitution, State Politics, and the Idaho Watersheds
Project Litigation, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 187 (2003) (describing the efforts of one outspoken
environmentalist to bid on state-held grazing leases on state-held school trust lands); and Randy
Lee Loftis, The Latest Range Wars: Ranchers, Loggers Fight Environmentalists Who Seek To
Lease Federal Land, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 22, 1996, at IA (documenting similar
disputes).
77. MERRILL, supra note 60, at 39-40, 45-46, 49-51.
78. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315 to 315o-1 (2000).
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government to do the dirty work of excluding for them and, of course, not
charge them much.
The trouble was, as the heart of Merrill's book wonderfully
demonstrates, this grand plan did not work out as the ranchers had hoped.
Not so long after the major national forest lands were reserved in the early
1900s, the Forest Service started getting bossy, telling the ranchers to do
this and not to do that. 79 By the early 1920s, to the great alarm of the
stockmen, some congressmen began to ruminate about making ranchers pay
something like market-rate grazing fees on federal forest lands.8° Merrill
notes that the thinness of the market made such ideas more problematic
than they might seem; in fact, nearby ranchers were the ones most anxious
to lease particular pasturage tracts. 81 But in some measure their
vulnerability was a product of their own earlier political success: The
ranchers had only become so dependent on nearby federal lands because the
Forest Service's leasing policy from the outset had favored adjacent ranch
owners.
82
These disputes over fees gave a glimpse of the property language that
would grow ever more pointed in the ranchers' relationships with the
federal government. The ranchers did not think that the United States
should act as other landowners did, at least not visA-vis themselves, who in
their own minds had borne the whole burden of making the range
valuable-hence their pained reaction when, as they complained, the Forest
Service started to act as if it were a "landlord."83 Merrill follows the
stockmen's organizations' thinking as some members began to mull over
different kinds of property arrangements. Some opined that they might get a
84better deal if the public lands were turned over to the states, and a few of
the ranchers' spokesmen again floated the idea that stockmen might best
become owners themselves after all,85 though the idea did not get a great
deal of traction in the 1920s. As it turned out, neither did the states' rights
campaign, perhaps because state ownership might have meant either a
79. See MERRILL, supra note 60, at 68-69, 78-80 (describing struggles between the Forest
Service and ranchers over policies dealing with rancher-built improvements, herd size, and
priority use).
80. Id. at 81-82.
81. Id. at 86; cf. id. at 100 (analogizing grazing rates to utility rates). One might note,
however, that the thinness of the market might have been less of a problem if grazing lands were
available for other uses as well, as homesteaders wished and as environmentalists later suggested.
For the latter, see Ryberg, supra note 76; and Loftis, supra note 76.
82. MERRILL, supra note 60, at 60-61.
83. Id. at 123; see also id. at 84, 88.
84. See, e.g., id. at 81, 104, 115-16 (discussing the rise of states' rights sentiments among
ranchers).
85. Id. at 93-94.
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different set of bossy bureaucrats or the unpleasant prospect of having to
buy their grazing lands, just from a new set of state owners.8 6
But all these conflicts about the national forest lands were soon to be
eclipsed by a backup plan: If the very large leftovers of the still-unsettled
and still-unreserved public lands could be withdrawn from homesteading
and then more or less opened up to the ranchers' use, perhaps the ranchers
could come back to that best of all possible worlds-exclusive access and
not much responsibility. The Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 did indeed close
the remainder of the range to homesteading, but alas, this new development
would soon echo the experience with the Forest Service.
At first, the stockmen got just about everything they wanted through
the local grazing district boards, which called the shots on grazing leases;
8 7
indeed, the ranchers' relationship with the understaffed and outgunned
Federal Grazing Service became the model for the "capture" theory of
administrative agencies, according to which regulators get coopted by the
very persons subject to regulation.88 But these glory days were not to last,
or at least not completely. Even the hapless Bureau of Land Management
(BLM), the successor agency to the original grazing bureau, began to act a
bit like the Forest Service before it, though with a lot less muscle. There
were more orders from bureaucrats, more grazing fee controversies, and
more states' rights ideas in response.8 9
The ensuing rancor has very much turned up the volume on property
rights language, leading to the core of Merrill's argument, which is that the
property metaphor hasn't worked out there on the rangelands. By the 1940s,
some of the ranchers had begun to insist that in some way they already
owned the grazing leases that they had so long enjoyed on a privileged
basis. 90 Merrill thinks that this turn to property talk was at least in part
structured by the Taylor Grazing Act itself and subsequent grazing
legislation, which followed the earlier Forest Service policy in favoring
nearby property owners in the assignment of grazing leases. 91 But in
response to the ranchers' property assertions in grazing leases, some federal
officials-among them Harold Ickes, the New Deal head of the Interior
Department-started to use the language of property rights in a discourse
86. See id. at 127-28 ("[S]tates' rightists never acknowledged that cession in and of itself did
not resolve the government's presence in western lands, for it simply replaced federal ownership
with state ownership.").
87. Id. at 153.
88. See id. at 136; see also PHILLIP 0. FOSs, POLITICS AND GRASS: THE ADMINISTRATION OF
GRAZING ON THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1960) (describing stockmen's takeover of the grazing
districts).
89. MERRILL, supra note 60, at 185-90, 194-200.
90. Id. at 195-201.
91. Id. at 141, 156.
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that continues to this day: The public lands belong to the public.
92
Environmental spokespersons, beginning with Bernard DeVoto in the
1940s, picked up this language and ran with it,93 and environmentalists are
still running with it today. Why, they ask, should the ranchers have special
privileges on public lands that belong to all of us? Why do they get cheap
leases not available to anyone else? Why should their nasty cows be able to
trample around in riparian areas, poisoning everybody's water and
spreading diseases to the wildlife that is supposed to be owned by the state?
And speaking of wildlife, why should ranchers be able to get the federal
government to poison prairie dogs and wolves and to arrange for helpless
bison to be slaughtered?94 Hey, this land is your land, this land is my land-
it's not their land.
But Merrill, like Brown in an entirely different context, thinks that all
this yakking about property mostly messes things up for both sides. The
ranchers have had no real legal justification for their assertion that they own
lands that were clearly under lease from the federal government. And in her
view, the federal agencies are just that-bureaucrats, not owners. 95 As for
public officials' and environmentalists' use of property language-the
public lands "belong" to all of us9 6 -well, says Merrill, public ownership is
a "murky technicality" 97 that environmentalists deployed to "blow[] open
notions of property at their seams"; 98 ownership presumably is about
confined spaces or entities, assigned to limited numbers of people for the
very purpose of concentrating the payoffs and costs of decisionmaking on
the decisionmakers themselves. The public at large, she argues, is not that
kind of an owner.99 More importantly, in her view, the ecological concerns
of the modem environmental movement can get stifled in the "box" of
property.l00
In the end, Merrill's central objection is that this talk of property in the
public lands just "calcifi[es]" positions and makes it impossible to come to
92. See id. at 201, 203 (describing federal agencies' assertions that the land belonged to the
federal government); cf id. at 180 (describing Ickes's property arguments against the grazing
advisory boards in the 1930s).
93. See id. at 192-93 (presenting DeVoto's arguments).
94. See Federico Cheever, From Population Segregation to Species Zoning: The Evolution of
Reintroduction Law Under Section 100) of the Endangered Species Act, I WYO. L. REV. 287, 342
& n.244 (2001) (describing the slaughter of wolves and prairie dogs in the early twentieth
century); Robert B. Keiter & Peter H. Froelicher, Bison, Brucellosis, and Law in the Greater
Yellowstone Ecosystem, 28 LAND & WATER L. REv. 1, 2-6, 14-15, 45-47 (1993) (discussing
modem bison destruction policies).
95. MERRILL, supra note 60, at 63, 154-55, 167.
96. Id. at 207 (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Id. at 154.
98. Id. at 207; see also id. at 192-93.
99. Id. at 65.
100. Id. at 208.
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new forms of accommodation.'0 ' So here it is again, as in Brown's Big
Reason for dislike of property for indigenous culture: In their respective
areas of concern, both authors say that property talk is out of place, leading
to rigidity and stasis just where we should be aiming for innovation and
accommodation.
With Merrill as with Brown, I would take a more sympathetic view of
at least some of these references to property. First of all, it is not property
that created those animosities, but rather the lack of clearly defined property
or, in the case of the federal lands, clearly enforced property. It is a part of a
"natural history" of property that rights need not be very sharply defined
when resources are plentiful. But when good things get scarce, ambiguities
about rights encourage anxieties, overreaching, and shoving matches;
indeed, people try to avoid such shoving matches by defining rights more
carefully.102 It has been the persistent ambiguity of the arrangements on the
public lands that has encouraged the ranchers to keep pushing and to keep
hoping that by forming pressure groups, concocting spurious claims to
privileged positions, and generally pounding the table, they might get
something nailed down that they never formally owned. No wonder the
environmentalists finally got mad. In this area as in so many others, the
absence of clearly defined property has induced people to fight over who
gets what, instead of recognizing ownership rights and bargaining for
exchanges.
The trouble with property talk on the range isn't just what Merrill says
it is. The really serious trouble is talking as if something is your property
when it isn't, that is to say, overreaching, just as overreaching is the trouble
with some of the property claims that Brown describes. But the fact that
people overreach should not mean that we ditch property. Quite the
contrary: It has been the absence of better-defined and better-defended
property-especially public property-that has encouraged this
overreaching. And, by the way, jettisoning property talk in favor of
relationship talk isn't likely to help much. Relationship talk or
accommodation talk has problems of its own; as Lisa Bernstein has so
brilliantly argued with respect to contracts, relationship talk is all well and
good when things are going well, but when push comes to shove, misplaced
relationship talk can lead to opportunism, more overreaching, and of course
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
101. Id. at 209.
102. For a locus classicus of this evolutionary argument, see Harold Demsetz, Toward a
Theory ofProperty Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 347 (1967).
1014 [Vol. 114: 991
HeinOnline -- 114 Yale L.J. 1014 2004-2005
Property in All the Wrong Places?
more fury, as some people try to claim as "rights" things that were just
extended to them as a matter of courtesy or convenience. °3
A second point is that property relationships could have been better
defined with respect to the rangeland. As Merrill makes clear, it was an
unfortunate artifact of the nineteenth century's antiquated political
conception of property that made Congress insist on small plots and reject
the possibility of large ranches-ranches of a size that might have better
matched the needs of grazing.' 0 4 John Wesley Powell suggested selling
large entitlements in 1879, and he was echoed by the economist A.F. Vass
in 1941.105 These interesting suggestions fell on deaf ears, victims of the
homesteading ideal in the early years, as well as the ranchers' obdurate
insistence that they themselves should have a privileged position and should
not have to pay (or pay much) for anything. 10 6 When the homesteading and
other settlement laws sliced and diced the public lands into plots that were
too small to support a living, they undermined more rational uses of land
and undoubtedly discouraged further permanent settlement.'0 7 And on those
huge swaths of public lands that went abegging for settlers and that did not
get withdrawn for national forests or parks, an underfunded and quiescent
federal grasslands management more or less gave away the store,
effectively inviting a grabfest by nearby ranchers and leaving us (though
Merrill herself is too polite to say so) with the current decimated
moonscape of public grazing lands. Even Merrill acknowledges that
without more clearly drawn property lines, federal agencies could not even
begin to exercise regulatory authority over this mess. 0 8 So is property to
blame for the current problems? How could it be? On the grasslands,
property was scarcely even tried, either from the private or the public side.
Speaking of public ownership, a third point could be taken as a bit of
quibble, but it is an important one. Merrill implies that public ownership is
really just a fiction, a technicality because the government acts primarily as
a sovereign and not as an owner-that is to say, more as a regulator rather
103. Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1796-802 (1996) (arguing for sticking to the
letter of contractual entitlements in disputes).
104. MERRILL, supra note 60, at 29.
105. Id. at 29, 106, 194-95.
106. Id. at 194-99.
107. A similar fate overtook some oil lands, where the relatively small-scale surface-land
ownership patterns created multiple claimants to underground reservoirs, very much impeding
rational patterns of exploration and development. See Gary D. Libecap, The Political Allocation of
Mineral Rights: A Re-Evaluation of Teapot Dome, 44 J. ECON. HIST. 381, 383-84 (1984). For an
economic analysis of other maladies specific to homesteading, particularly the inducements to
premature land improvement, see Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, The Race for Property
Rights, 33 J.L. & ECON. 177 (1990).
108. MERRILL, supra note 60, at 166-67; see also id. at 33, 65-66 (discussing the Forest
Service specifically).
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than a normal owner.1 09 But the collapse of ownership with property
overstates the case, even though others have similarly overstated it. 110 It is
certainly true that the United States's ownership role on the public lands is
broader than that of an ordinary owner, particularly vis-A-vis state property
regulation, a matter of very considerable annoyance to the states."'
Nevertheless, there is a longstanding and significant difference between all
governments' actions as regulators and their actions as owners. Though the
"govermmental"/"proprietary" distinction is not hard and fast, the
proprietary capacity is actually quite important-for example, for allowing
public authorities to commit credibly to their contractual obligations or to
run public enterprises. This is because public authorities, in their capacities
as regulators, must remain ever flexible; they cannot bind their own future
decisions or those of their successors. Thus, if they were only "sovereigns"
or regulators, no sensible people would contract with governments at all.' 12
Without a proprietary capacity, the United States would be hard put to do
something as relatively businesslike as managing oil leases on the public
lands.
But one might think that the governmental/proprietary distinction is
merely nitpicking over legal conventions. The much more important
question is whether it really means anything for the public at large to be the
owner of property. Merrill is skeptical; behind so-called public ownership
she sees just a bunch of bureaucracies. 13 She relents only very slightly
when she observes that in the turf-conscious bickering between the major
federal land agencies in the 19 30s, each agency thought that it would best
serve the public's interest. 1
4
To be sure, conceptions of the public's interest can be quite varied,
especially on a subject so complex as the public lands. But varied as they
may be, we still expect those conceptions to be a matter of democratic
debate. Bureaucrats are supposed to listen to that debate and not just to the
importuning of their friends and favorites. That was the complaint of the
"capture" theorists. Merrill, consistently, is skeptical about the capture
109. See id. at 64-66, 154-55, 202.
110. Id. at 65 (citing the work of Morris Cohen).
111. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (affirming U.S. authority over
wild horses and burros on public lands despite contrary state estray law); cf Cal. Coastal Comm'n
v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987) (denying per se federal preemption of a state coastal
commission's land use regulations on mining in national forest lands).
112. See, e.g., John B. Nesbitt, Local Government, 2002-2003 Survey of New York Law,
54 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1275, 1281 (2004) (describing as "important" a new case making the
governmental/proprietary distinction in a contractual context).
113. MERRILL, supra note 60, at 154, 167. Merrill's skepticism on this issue echoes the
public choice theorists, who generally analyze bureaucratic actions as self-seeking; for one (whom
she cites, id. at 75-76), see GARY D. LIBECAP, LOCKING UP THE RANGE: FEDERAL LAND
CONTROLS AND GRAZING 9 (1981).
114. MERRILL, supra note 60, at 167.
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arguments too." 5 But really thoroughgoing skeptics would say that because
there is no public interest separate from private interests, and because
bureaucrats always act in their own interest, the logical conclusion should
be to sell off the public lands altogether-that is, turn them into private
property.
116
Merrill does not seem to take her skepticism of public ownership that
far, but if she did, she would find still another quite ancient legal idea of
public ownership in the way; in fact it is a rather radical one, though it
applied only to some specialized properties. This more radical idea is that
certain kinds of property belong inherently to the unorganized public-all
of us, not just government officials; we are the beneficial owners, and
governmental actors at most hold it in trust for us. The Romans had this
conception of what is now called "public trust" property, and it has
resurfaced regularly in European and American property law.1 17 The
general thought behind this body of law is that certain resources, whether
physical spaces (like waterways or roads) or metaphoric ones (as some say
of the Internet), are best used when kept open for the public at large.
Whether the United States's public lands are resources of that kind is
certainly a matter of debate, but the concept of the general public as
beneficial owner is by no means untenable as a matter of property theory or
practice. It has been around a long time.
Moreover, the idea has some practical significance. By emphasizing the
idea of the public as beneficial owner, the early environmentalists expanded
people's imagination about alternative uses of the grasslands, alternative
uses that might indeed compete favorably with grazing-hiking, birding,
and camping, for example, as well as wilderness restoration and
conservation and, yes, ecosystem management, which Merrill regards as
uncontainable within the confines of property. But like Brown, Merrill
underestimates the capacity of property to morph into new forms as new
issues arise. Despite the ranchers' earlier protestations to the contrary,
nowadays some of them realize that there are other valuable uses of the
range-such as wildlife protection-that do not involve grazing domestic
animals.
1 18
115. Id. at 154.
116. For a modest proposal to this effect, see TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL,
FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 179 (rev. ed. 2001) (arguing that privatization of public
lands would be ideal, though currently impracticable).
117. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 713 (1986); see also Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and
Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property in the Information Age, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 89 (reviewing various categories of Roman public property).
118. See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, For Wildlife with Wanderlust, Their Own Highway, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 2, 2004, at A26 (describing how ranchers have cooperated with environmental groups to
develop an international wildlife-migration corridor along the "Crown of the Continent").
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The dawning idea that the range belongs to all of us opened people's
eyes to many of those alternative possibilities. It was the environmentalists'
insistence that the public really does own the public lands-that is, a kind
of rights consciousness-that introduced new players into this field and
gave some leverage to these players in constructing new ways to manage
the public lands. Once again, you can negotiate until you are blue in the
face, but the outcome will depend mightily on the assets that you initially
carry into the room. Public ownership is a big asset, and, while some
stockraising interests still may not like it, everyone knows that they are not
the only ones who can claim entitlements any more. That fact has
dramatically changed the negotiations about the uses of the public lands.
People who think about the public lands have groped their way toward
understanding new forms of property, moving from land auctions to
preemption to homesteading in the earlier nineteenth century, and then to
specialized reserved lands and on to specialized leases; these devices have
been conceptualized under theories running from republican yeomanry to
"multiple-use, sustained-yield" to dominant use, among others. There are
even fuzzy rights in this domain, as in the rights that concerned citizens
now have to contest federal actions under the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969.19 These fuzzy rights serve people with quite
diffuse interests; indeed, the vast deployment of the environmental impact
review under NEPA suggests that native peoples aren't the only ones who
want to make the flow of decisionmaking a bit more viscous and to bring
some more people to the table before those alarmingly rapid market forces
gobble up everything. Whether or not one considers such consultative rights
"property" in themselves, they are linked to a very considerable extent to a
new theory of public property, or perhaps I should say a revived old theory,
in the concept of the public trust. 120 This is a theory of the public lands that
is still emergent, still controversial, perhaps even crazy, but one that clearly
illustrates that property does not necessarily begin and end with the
conventional fee simple. Public property, and the public as beneficial owner
of that property, are venerable and meaningful concepts in our law.
Fourth and finally, the slippage of the various parties into property
language may have been inevitable, for a variety of reasons. One is the
general pattern in which property rights often take shape as resources come
under pressure. Under those circumstances, property is a way of managing
119. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2000). For citizens' standing to sue, see Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); and Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
120. For the article that launched the modem public trust theory and very much linked it to
NEPA, see Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970). For a brief survey of its subsequent development, see
Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351 (1998).
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conflict, and the emergence of property language may simply have been a
normal development with greater and more heterogeneous demands for the
public lands and their resources. A more interesting reason is that any
discussion of entitlements is apt to slide into property language, as in the
famous example of James Madison's assertion of "a property" in his
reputation, his religion, and a variety of other matters. 121 Property is a
particularly visible and graspable form of entitlement, and a reference to
property concretizes all kinds of claims of entitlement. It should not be a
major wonder that both ranchers and environmentalists try to bolster their
claims through the rhetoric of property. They are not the first to do so, and
they will not be the last.
When we come right down to it, we do not have a lot of ways other
than property to talk about people's relationships to resources and to one
another with respect to resources. The authors of these two truly excellent
books may not approve of the "propertization" of talk about native culture
and the public domain, but perhaps this rhetorical propertization has some
metaphoric implications that have yet to be explored. Certainly rights talk
in other spheres has this metaphoric dimension, as when we talk about the
rights of children or animals or trees, none of whom can stand up in court
and speak for themselves. In these contexts we use rights talk to signify
something important-something worthy of dignity and, yes, respect.
1 22
Property doesn't just mean "it's all mine, so butt out"--and this is a
point that might be addressed both to Merrill's and to Brown's baleful view
of property and property talk as rigid and unyielding. Property is one of the
most sociable institutions that human beings have created, depending as it
does on mutual forbearance and on the recognition of and respect for the
claims of others. Trusteeship and guardianship are part of property as well,
and those terms generate a species of property talk much used by
environmentalists. Environmentalists, like some native peoples, may be
using this kind of property language to convey a quite subtle message about
our relationship with resources, with one another, and with the future. It is a
message that signals a sensibility of kinship with the natural world, as well
as a careful attention to the legacy that is left to generations to come.
123
That's a metaphoric meaning of property too-an even wider metaphor of
respect than the one that Robert Frost told us about so long ago, in the story
of the mutual respect that property brings to good neighbors.
121. James Madison, Property, NAT'L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON 266, 266 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983).
122. See RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 6, 234-35 (1999)
(arguing that the language of rights is used as a signal of the importance and need for protection of
the subject).
123. See Carol M. Rose, Given-ness and Gift: Property and the Quest for Environmental
Ethics, 24 ENVTL. L. 1, 18-19, 25-26 (1994).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
10192005]
HeinOnline -- 114 Yale L.J. 1019 2004-2005
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law JournalHeinOnline -- 114 Yale L.J. 1020 2004-2005
